Permissions and command guard
Ask / Edits / Auto decide whether a tool asks. The command guard still runs in every mode, including Auto.
Always denied (unless you allowlist that command)
The guard splits a command on ; && || | newlines $() backticks subshells, strips wrappers (sudo, env, nice, command, …), and recurses into sh -c, bash -lc, eval, xargs, here-strings, find -exec, cmd /c, powershell -Command.
Denied patterns include:
- Forced / recursive removal
- Destructive git:
reset --hard,clean -f, force / delete / mirror push,checkout -f,branch -D,stash clear,reflog expire,filter-branch - Git config keys that run programs (
core.sshCommand,alias.x=!…, …) - Downloads or decoded payloads piped into a shell or interpreter (
curl | sh) - Raw device writes
- Recursive
chmod/chown - Windows
del /s,rd /s,Remove-Item -Recurse,format,reg delete,diskpart, PowerShell-EncodedCommand/iexof downloaded code
Deny always wins over Always / Ask in the policy file. Tools overlay → Path & command policy: one rule per line, allow|ask|deny + pattern. AGENTS.md always / ask / never blocks merge in too.
Closed cheap cases (2.2)
One-hop VAR=cmd; $VAR / eval "$VAR" for those destructive patterns, and an interpreter (sh / bash / python / node) running a workspace path this turn (or the last N mutating tools) just wrote: deny in Ask/Edits, ask in Auto.
Still open
A denylist cannot be complete:
- Encoded scripts
makerecipes- Multi-hop indirection
- Scripts written outside the recent-write window
Use Ask or Edits on untrusted work. fullAuto (YOLO) on an untrusted repo should be treated as disposable.
Hard path denies and secret-file ask are separate from the shell guard (~/.ssh, .env*, workspace boundary).